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BAR BRIEFS

REVIEW OF NORTH DAKOTA DECISIONS
Brown vs. Workmen's Compensation Bureau. Plaintiff, a telephone operator, while using standard equipment (head phone) that
was in proper working order, was so affected by the vibrations, static,
noises and bell ringing as to be compelled to quit work and seek medical aid. The attending physician testified that his opinion was probably speculative, and that the ear injury was due to the employment
which opinion was partly based on the fact that he could not think of
any other cause. HELD: that the evidence was sufficient to support
the judgment of the trial court that plaintiff had sustained an injury.
in the course of employment.
Krogh vs. Great West Life Assurance Co. Plaintiff's husband
applied for life insurance Feb. 25, 1926, was examined March 19 th,
1926, and paid first year's premium. Policy was issued about April
I, 1926, sent to defendant's North Dakota state agent, and by him returned to company on learning of the insured's illness. The premium
was returned. The insured died early in April. At the trial, on objection of defendant, trial court's version of law of case made it useless for plaintiff to proceed, so an offer of proof was made. The
objection was that no contract of insurance was established. HELD:
That an offer of proof must be comprehensive enough to cover all
issues not admitted or supported by testimony of witnesses; that
where such offer contains competent and incompetent testimony the
trial court is not required to separate the two; and that proof as per
the whole of the offer was insufficient to establish a cause of action.
Mercer County vs. State Bonding Fund. A county treasurer,
bonded under the State Bonding Fund law, deposited sums in excess
of amounts permitted by the depository bonds of certain banks. Part
of the excess deposits represented collections by the state's attorney
on seed liens, the certificates of deposit for which were later iurned
over to the treasurer. Upon discovery of the excess deposits by the
county commissioners, which was after the banks closed, demand wts
made upon the treasurer, and subsequently claim filed with the Bonding Fund. HELD: That the Bonding Fund is liable to the extent
of the excess deposits over the amounts permitted by the depository
bonds, but without prejudice to the defendant's right to present the
issue of actual insolvency of the bank at the time of the transfer irom
the state's attorney to the treasurer.
McKenzie County vs. Casady and Northern Town & Land Co.
(First National Bank of Williston, Intervenor). The record titled to

certain real estate was in the defendant land company, which executed
and delivered to C. a contract for deed. This contract was assigned
to intervenor as security for moneys due intervenor. Two years later
plaintiff recovered judgment against C. Some time after this the
terms of the contract were fully satisfied by C. and a number of
deeds (blank as to grantee) were delivered to C., and by him to intervenor bank, which had the deeds recorded. No charge of fraud or
conspiracy is presented or proved as between C. and intervenor, but
as between the two defendants it was alleged, and evidence presented
to prove, that the transactions were fraudulent. Two days prior to
the recording of the deeds this action was brought and notice of lis
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pendens filed. HELD: That no fraud or conspiracy was proved as
neither C. nor intervenor owed a duty to record the instruments; that
filing of lis pendens gave plaintiff no rights of priority, but merely
put intervenor upon notice to present its claims to the real estate;
that defendant C. has an interest in the real estate which may be
reached by execution, and that plaintiff is entitled in an equity action to
have such interestdetermined and subjected to the lien of its judgment.
Sullivan vs. Soo Railway Co. Plaintiff, a member of a section
crew, while riding on a gasoline speeder to place where work was to
be per.formed, was thrown from speeder when it ran into a main line
switch, left open by order of the conductor of a work train. The foreman of the section crew, located at the front end of the speeder, failed
to notice a target placed near the open switch, and the members of his
crew, who had been ordered to watch for trains from behind, also
failed to note it. The evidence was conflicting on the issue of whether
plaintiff's injuries-testified by plaintiff as injury to left ankle, bruise
on left hip, injury to back and to bladder-were due to the accident or to
constitutional disease, the symptoms noted by the physicians probably
supporting either theory, but physical findings strongly indicated the
presence of the disease while plaintiff was with the army in France,
at which time an operation for such disease was performed. Judgment
was entered for plaintiff at $2o,ooo. HELD: The rule is elementary
that it is only when the evidence is such that reasonable men must be
driven to the conclusion that plaintiff was not acting with reasonable
care for his own safety and that his failure to do so was the cause of
the injury that the court is warranted in holding contributory negligence
to be a bar to recovery. Judgment was, however, reduced to $12,ooo,
and new trial ordered in case plaintiff refused to accept the reduction.
State Bar Association meets at Grand Forks, September 6 and 7.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION DECISIONS
Where deceased employee is not the parent with whom children
resided at time of injury, and the other parent survives, children's right
to compensation rests on their dependency on deceased at the time of
the injury and proof thereof must be made. Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp. vs. IndustrialCommission, 255 Pac. 598 (Arizona).
Telephone operator, using head set, alleged she received a shock
by reason of "banging noise" in ear, resulting in .disability, is not entitled to award where the evidence does not clearly relate the injury
to the employment. Liability can not be based on choice between two
views, equally compatible with e',idence. Bell Telephone Co. vs. Industrial Commission, 156 N. E. 319 (Illinois). (Evidently contra to
holding of N. Dak., in Brown vs. Bureau.)
An award for permanent total disability is justified only where the
employee has been rendered wholly and permanently incapable of work
at a gainful occupation. The burden of proof is on claimant and
where it appears he is able to do light work, the burden of proof has
not been sustained.-Consolidated Coal Co. vs. Industrial Commission, i56 N. E. 358 (Illinois).

